The 'disappearing States' or 'sinking islands' phenomenon 
INTRODUCTION
'It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.' The 'disappearing States' or 'sinking islands' phenomenon has become the 'canary in the coalmine' 2 -the litmus test for the dramatic climate change impacts on human society. Atlantisstyle predictions of whole countries disappearing beneath the waves raise fascinating legal issues. As a purely academic exercise, pondering the dissolution of a State because of climate change rather than conflict, cession, merger or succession entails novel questions that go to the heart of legal rules on the creation and extinction of States. However, much of this deliberation is taking place in the abstract, such that the premises for why, when and how States might 'disappear', and the consequences of this, do not always sit comfortably with the empirical evidence. 3 There is therefore a risk that however academically stimulating and challenging these questions of extinction are, their practical relevance is undermined by some of the assumptions on which they are based. This, in turn, may lead to the adoption of well-intentioned but ultimately misguided policies. This paper is in part a response to the observation that a lack of specificity in climate migration research means that many of the normative and policy recommendations being made at the macro level are divorced from context. 4 Accordingly, it is anchored in a case study of the small Pacific island States of Kiribati and Tuvalu, which have become emblematic of the socalled 'sinking States' and 'climate refugee' phenomenon. 5 The paper argues that the focus on loss of territory as the indicator of a State's disappearance may be misplaced, 6 since small island States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu will become uninhabitable long before they physically disappear. In legal terms, the absence of population, rather than of territory, may provide the first signal that an entity no longer displays the full indicia of statehood (namely, a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States).
However, in the present context, the precise point at which a State loses its legal identity as a State is unclear. International law contemplates the formal dissolution of the State in cases of absorption (by another State), merger (with another State) and dissolution (with the emergence of successor States). 7 The potential extinction of a State because of climate change is markedly distinct, however, because the territory it abandons will not (cannot) be assumed by any other State. While the motivation behind this paper is to determine the legal status of people displaced from 'disappearing States', its primary focus is on how and when such States would cease to exist, since this necessarily links to the ability to maintain nationality. In doing so, it examines mechanisms such as the government in exile as a means of enabling the State to continue even when the territory is uninhabitable, and briefly considers alternatives to full statehood, such as a self-governing territory in free association with another State.
II CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS: MACRO VERSUS MICRO
One of the biggest drawbacks of much of the scholarship being generated on 'climate migration' is a tendency to treat climate-related movement as a single phenomenon that can be discussed in a general way. As Kälin's chapter highlights, a number of very different scenarios are captured within this rubric, and it is only through examining them separately, with attention to their distinctive and common features, that any meaningful policy or normative frameworks can be developed. 8 While an overarching framework is helpful for identifying the range of climate impacts on human movement, the commonality of climate change as a driver is an insufficient rationale for grouping together a disparate array of displacement scenarios and proceeding to discuss policy responses in generic terms. Indeed, considerable conceptual confusion has arisen because of a lack of rigor and/or awareness in employing consistent terminology to describe those who move. Thus, despite an exponential expansion of the literature on environmental migration in the past few years, its 'cascading' or 'mainstreaming' effect has resulted in an oversimplification of the issues. As Barnett argues, we have in fact lost meaning because so much of the discussion lacks a real geo-social-political context. 9 This is problematic for the development of law and policy, because it risks being inappropriate and inaccurately targeted if it does not reflect understandings about the differences in nature, timeframe, distance, scale and permanence of potential movement.
The 'sinking island State' phenomenon is one such example. It is frequently raised in the media and scholarly literature, 10 but rarely analysed. 11 It has become emblematic of the most extreme impacts of climate change on human society, but is used haphazardly even by experts in the field. 12 In part, this may be because of the way that some small island States themselves have used the imagery of the drowning homeland to emphasise the impacts of climate change. Perhaps the most arresting example of this to date was an underwater Cabinet meeting held by the government of the Maldives in September 2009 to highlight its concerns about rising sea levels. 13 At a more formal level, in June 2009, the Pacific Island States, with the support of a number of other countries, sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution on 'Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications'.
14 During debate, delegates referred to the unprecedented 'real possibility' of 'the disappearance of whole nations', 15 and the resolution's 'pursuit of greater guarantees of our territorial integrity'. 16 The President of the Federated States of 8 W Kälin, 'Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement', in the present volume. Part of Kaelin's chapter is an attempt to disaggregate these scenarios for the appropriate institutional, legal and political responses to them. 9 Barnett and Webber, above n 4. At a recent conference in Geneva, one distinguished academic referred to the 'tens of millions of people who will sink from their islands'. The remark went uncontested despite the fact that the island States at risk do not have combined populations of anything near this magnitude. Micronesia stressed the impact of climate change on 'our own security and territorial integrity, and on our very existence as inhabitants of very small and vulnerable island nations.' 17 The President of Vanuatu noted the risk that 'some of our Pacific colleague nations will be submerged. If such a tragedy should happen, then the United Nations and its members will have failed in their first and most basic duty to a Member and its innocent people, as stated in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.'
18 Arguing along the same lines, the President of Nauru expressed the expectation that 'the Security Council will review particularly sensitive issues such as the implications of the loss of land and resources and the displacement of people for sovereignty and international legal rights.'
19

III THE NATURE OF DISAPPEARANCE
Though some States themselves use the 'disappearing islands' imagery to dramatic effect, the empirical evidence suggests that a simple 'climate change' cause and effect is not so straightforward, and motivations for movement even less so. That is not to say that climate change is not having real impacts on small island States; it is. But the Atlantis-style predictions that have captivated the imagination of some are unlikely to materialise as the means by which States cease to exist. While 'defined territory' is one criterion of statehood, and though territory ultimately may disappear as a result of rising sea levels, it is more probable that the other indicia of statehood-a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States-will have been challenged prior to this occurrence. For low-lying islands such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, insufficient fresh water, as the water lens shrinks, has been cited as the most probable trigger for rendering these countries uninhabitable in the longer term. 20 Climate change threatens to reduce habitable land in other ways as well, including through coastal erosion and increased salination of the soil. This will impact upon agricultural capacity and, in turn, is likely to lead to greater urbanisation (as people move from the outer islands) and increased pressure on an already poor labour market. There are also negative health consequences as people become increasingly reliant on imported processed foods. It is therefore likely that long before the land disappears, the bulk of the population will have moved.
Movement away from island States such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, like the nature of the climate process itself, is likely to be slow and gradual, although climatic events such as cyclones or king tides may, in the interim period, trigger more sudden, but probably temporary (and internal) moves. 21 Migration is, and has long been, a natural human adaptation strategy to The discussion about 'sinking islands' is premised on the assumption that at some point, the territories of States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu will disappear-either completely, or to the point that they can no longer sustain permanent populations. Though international law contemplates the disappearance of States, it does so within the context of State succession. The conventional ways in which a State can become extinct-through voluntary absorption by another State, merger with another State, extinction by dissolution (voluntary or involuntary) 26 all presuppose that a successor State begins to exist on, or assumes control over, the territory of the previous State. Indeed, the two treaties on State succession define this as 'the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory'. 27 There is never simply a void. As Marek observes in her leading work on the identity and continuity of States, a State's extinction entails a succession and prevents any further continuity of that State; a 'miraculous resurrection' is impossible. 28 In the present context, unless the territory of Tuvalu or Kiribati were ceded to another State, the normal rules on State succession would not apply. For this reason, this paper turns its attention to the creation of States, to determine at what point the absence of certain criteria of statehood might lead other States (and the international community, through international organisations) to deny a State's continued existence.
V WHAT IS A 'STATE'?
Whether or not a State exists is a 'mixed question of law and fact'. 29 The absence of a formal international law definition of a 'State' might be explained by the fact that questions about an entity's nature only tend to arise in borderline cases, as well as by the tendency of States to preserve as much freedom of action as possible with respect to new States. 30 Craven, above n 7, 160. He goes on to state: 'What this means is that emphasis should not be so much upon the existence of "external" rules of succession that allow for the "transference" of rights and duties from one subject to another, but rather upon determining the extent to which legal continuity should follow from elements of material (social, cultural or political) identity.' 37 Crawford, above n 6, 46. needs to be held, and loss of some territory at least should not affect the legal status of the entity, since it is not necessary for a State to have precisely defined boundaries. 38 The requirement is only that 'the right to be a State is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with respect to some area of territory.' 39 Such territory does not have to be contiguous, and '[l]ittle bits of States can be enclaved within other States.' 40 The link between statehood and territory is crucial, and inherent in possession of territory (as an indicator of statehood) is exclusive control over it. 41 Crawford therefore frames the territorial requirement of statehood as 'a constituent of government and independence' rather than as a separate criterion. 42 While Lowe argues that the concept of a State 'is rooted in the concept of control of territory', this is arguably more about ensuring that the criterion of independence is met rather than about the territory per se, since such control is 'to ensure that activities within its borders are not regulated by any other State'. 43 Jessup argued that the rationale for a State needing to possess territory was that 'one cannot contemplate a State as a kind of disembodied spirit … [T]here must be some portion of the earth's surface which its people inhabit and over which its Government exercises authority.'
44 And yet, as will be examined below, States can continue to function even when their governments operate from outside national territory. The mechanism of the government in exile has enabled governments to function extraterritorially, although this has always been contemplated as temporary and exceptional. Furthermore, it is premised on the continued existence of a permanent population on the State's territory (although the government in exile also retains jurisdiction over nationals abroad as well). Indeed, the general requirement that States have 'a certain coherent territory effectively governed' 45 assumes that there remains a population on that territory to be governed.
B Permanent Population
38
See eg Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 AD 11, 15 in which the GermanPolish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal observed that it is sufficient that 'territory has a sufficient consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited'. 39 Crawford, above n 6, 46. 44 US Ambassador Jessup, UNSCOR 383 rd meeting (2 December 1948), 11, cited in Crawford, above n 6, 44. Yet, in the context of belligerent occupation, Grant writes: 'Territory is not necessary to statehood, at least after statehood has been established … [it] appears to be the case that once an entity has established itself in international society as a state, it does not lose statehood by losing its territory or effective control over that territory': TD Grant, 'Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents' (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 403, 435. 45 Crawford, above n 6, 52.
Just as international law does not require a State's territory to be a minimum size, nor is there minimum population requirement. 46 Indeed, Tuvalu is the second smallest State by population (after the Vatican). The notion of a 'permanent' population simply means that it cannot be transitory. For present purposes, the relevant question is whether a State ceases to meet this criterion of statehood when a large proportion-or all-of its population lives outside the State's territory.
There are already a number of Pacific countries with very large populations outside their territory, and yet this does not affect their ability to continue to function as States. For example, 56.9 per cent of Samoans and 46 per cent of Tongans live outside their own country. 47 Thus, the proportion of population living on the territory does not seem to be determinative of the population criterion for statehood. But if an exodus of population is accompanied by, or premised on, the imminent or eventual loss of territory, then does it assume a different significance? If no population remains on the territory, can the State continue to exist by retaining its own outpost on the territory (as is being contemplated in Kiribati) or elsewhere (as a government in exile or on territory that another State permits it to use)? This links to the next section: at what point does a government cease to function?
C Government
The existence of an effective government satisfies another requirement of statehood: independence. Crawford distinguishes between these two criteria as follows: 'government is treated as the exercise of authority with respect to persons and property within the territory of the State; whereas independence is treated as the exercise, or the right to exercise, such authority with respect to other States.' 48 He regards government as the most important criterion of statehood, 'since all the others depend upon it', 49 but notes that in practice its application may be much more complex (as it will be in borderline cases that its identification and scope will be tested).
States may nonetheless choose to recognise an entity as a State even where it is doubtful that the full signs of statehood exist. For example, in 1960 Congo was widely recognised as a State and was accepted as a UN member without dissent, even though it lacked an effective government. 50 Crawford concludes that this was because the requirement of government may be less stringent than thought, and, importantly, that it has two aspects: 'the actual exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority.' 51 In that case, the conferral of Crawford, above n 6, 55. With respect to 'territory', it refers in this sense 'to the extent of governmental power exercised, or capable of being exercised, with respect to some territory and population. independence by the former colonial power Belgium meant that there was no State against which the recognition of Congo could be unlawful, and the assumption followed that where a former sovereign grants full independence then the new State has the right to govern its territory. The case of secession is different because the seceding State has to establish its adverse claim, which includes demonstrating effective and stable exercise of governmental powers. 52 Indeed, this may explain why the presumption of continuity is so strong. First, premature recognition of another State could be seen as unlawful interference in the domestic affairs of the original State, which itself might undermine international stability. 53 Secondly, and related to the first point, there would otherwise be a void in international relations in which States would 'find it difficult or impossible to continue many mutually advantageous economic, administrative and technical relations with other nations'. 54 Arguably, the case of 'disappearing islands' is more akin to the former, in that there is no competing claim and the presumption of continuity will apply until States no longer recognise the government (which may be in exile). 55 At the margins, the notion of continuity becomes quite subjective: '[i]n many instances the claim to continuity made by the State concerned will be determinative; other States will be content to defer to the position taken.'
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D Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States
The capacity to enter into relations with other States is a conflation of the requirements of government and independence. It is, accordingly, a consequence, rather than a criterion, of statehood. 57 Crawford regards independence (sometimes also called 'sovereignty' 58 ) as the central criterion for statehood, since it is the right to exercise 'in regard to a portion of the globe … to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.' 59 It has two main elements: a separate existence within reasonably coherent borders, and not being subject to the authority of any other State. On the other hand, the absence of any other State staking a claim over the territory may make it easier for States to deny its continuity, since there is no adverse claim (and thus no risk of premature recognition which could constitute interference in the State's domestic affairs). 56 Crawford, above n 6, 668, referring also to R Mullerson, 'The Continuity and Succession of States, By Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia ' (1993) 60 Crawford, above n 6, 66 (fn omitted).
It is important to distinguish between independence as an 'initial qualification' for statehood, and its role for a State's 'continued existence'. 61 Crucially, for present purposes, the strong presumption of continuity of existing States means that other States may continue to treat it as such despite a lack of effectiveness, 62 or even a 'very extensive loss of actual authority'. Similarly, when a government operates in exile, the State continues to exist but its governmental functions are (the assumption is, temporarily) unable to be performed from within its own territory. Since the principle of territorial sovereignty means that a government may only act as a government in exile with the consent (express or implied) of the State in which it is located, 65 the powers of such a government are necessarily more circumscribed than when it operates within its own territory. For example, in cases concerning the scope of jurisdiction of the courts of governments in exile within Britain in the 1940s, it was observed that 'the sovereignty of any State is unrestricted on its own territory only, while on foreign territory it naturally yields to the sovereignty of the foreign State', 66 and 'this jurisdiction [of Dutch service courts] is only possible so far as it is authorised by the British legislature and can only be exercised in accordance with the statutory provisions referred to and subject to the conditions and safeguards specified by statute'. 67 However, provided the government in exile's functions are not interfered with, or controlled by, the host State (or any other), its independence is preserved.
VI GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE
There is a strong presumption in international law that States continue to exist even if there is a period without a (or an effective) government. 68 This shows the distinction between the 'State' and 'government', on which the legal position of the government in exile depends. 69 It might also suggest that States are willing to tolerate a hiatus between the loss of indicia of statehood and acknowledgement that a State has ceased to exist. (Lord Wright), cited in Talmon, above n 65, 217. However, the host State cannot prescribe how that jurisdiction is to be exercised: 218. 68 Crawford, above n 6, 34. The term 'government in exile' does not denote a special status or subject of international law, but rather reflects the domicile of a government (namely, 'the depository of a State's sovereignty and its representative organ in international relations'). 70 History is replete with examples of governments of a State being able to operate as a government in exile in the territory of another State. 71 The institution is most common in the case of belligerent occupation or illegal annexation. Traditionally, it has operated on the assumption that it is a time-bound mechanism which enables a government to operate outside its territory until it once again becomes possible for that government to reassert its control there.
The fact that governments can operate in exile suggests that the existence of territory, while essential to the original constitution of that entity as a State, is not integral to the exercise of certain governmental functions. As the French Foreign Minister wrote in 1814: 'A sovereign whose States are conquered … by the conquest only loses de facto possession and consequently retains the right to do everything that does not require that possession.'
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Though a government's absence from its State does not automatically suspend or terminate existing treaties, 73 if it has to operate in exile then certain treaties may be terminated (or suspended) for reasons such as impossibility of performance or a fundamental change of circumstances.
74
Functions that governments have continued to perform in exile include treaty-making, maintaining diplomatic relations, and conferring immunities, privileges and jurisdiction over nationals. 75 In particular, the exercise of diplomatic protection has included the provision of consular representation, the lodging of protests, arranging deportations of nationals, the conclusion of amnesty agreements and the provision of passports and identity documents to prevent nationals from being treated as stateless persons. 76 This last function is of particular relevance to the climate-displacement context. In this regard, however, it is interesting to note that such documents have also been validly issued or extended by authorities in exile recognised in a lesser capacity than a government.
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The government in exile idea is premised on there still being an identifiable population over which the government has jurisdiction. In the conventional case, the majority of those people will continue to reside in the State's territory, from which the government is temporarily severed. In the 'disappearing State' scenario, the need for the government to operate in exile is premised on the uninhabitability of the State's territory, at least for the majority of the population. Accordingly, given that the bulk of the population will be residing in other sovereign States, they will be subject to the laws and jurisdiction of those States. The role of the home State therefore becomes the same as the jurisdiction that any State can exercise with respect to its nationals abroad (predominantly diplomatic protection). Once people begin to acquire dual nationality, then the presumption of diplomatic protection may gradually favour the State in which the person resides (on the assumption that this is where nationality is more 'effective'). 78 Over time, the function of the government in exile will wane. In particular, if the government in exile over time merged with the organs of the host State, especially if done voluntarily, 79 then this would normally result in the first State's extinction (provided 'there is no other perceived international interest in asserting the continuity of the State').
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As Kälin notes in his contribution to this volume, it is unlikely that small island States will readily relinquish their claims to statehood. 81 State practice suggests that the international community would be willing to continue to accept maintenance of the status quo (recognition of on-going statehood) even when the facts no longer seem to support the State's existence. Furthermore, the point at which a State such as Tuvalu or Kiribati could be said to have finally ceased to exist would depend not just on isolated acts of non-recognition by individual States, but their cumulative effect. 82 In this regard, we are looking for 'a general acceptance by the international community as a whole that the situation has been resolved', rather than any particular length of time passing.
83 Accordingly, '[a] State is not necessarily extinguished by substantial changes in territory, population or government, or even, in some cases, by a combination of all three.' 84 Indeed, its legal identity may be preserved to a degree even if it becomes a protectorate with some international legal personality.
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VIII STATELESSNESS?
If the State does cease to exist, then what is the legal status of its (prior) population? In the absence of having acquired a new nationality, could its people be considered 'stateless' as a matter of international law?
Even when a State becomes extinct according to conventional international law, the resultant legal status of the population on the territory is unclear. 86 There is no general right to nationality in customary international law, although there is certainly 'a strong presumption in favor of the prevention of statelessness in any change of nationality, including in a state 78 In dual nationality cases, the contemporary approach, based on the rule of real and effective nationality, is to 'search for "stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved"', involving consideration of 'all relevant factors, including habitual residence, center of interests, Kälin, above n 8. 82 Crawford, above n 6, 704-5. See also Talmon, above n 65, 174ff. 83 Crawford, above n 6, 704. 
succession.'
87 Although article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a right to a nationality, it lacks a correlative duty on the State to confer nationality. 88 Indeed, the absence of a right to nationality in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been ascribed to the complexity of the issue and States' inability to agree on its inclusion in the treaty. 89 The closest one comes to locating such a duty is the 'negative duty' arising under the statelessness treaties.
90
While treaty law aims to prevent the inhabitants of an existing State from becoming stateless when a new State emerges on that territory, 91 there is divergent practice on whether nationality automatically changes or whether further provision has to be made by the new State for that to occur. 92 Crawford believes that the better view, in line with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Question concerning the Acquisition of Polish Nationality, is that, subject to any stipulation to the contrary, people habitually resident in the territory of the new State acquire its nationality, for all international purposes, and lose their former nationality, although the new State may choose to delimit further who it will regard as its nationals. 93 While the issue of State succession does not apply to the Kiribati or Tuvalu context, the relevant point here is that existing international law lacks uniform practice in satisfactorily resolving the issue of nationality when one State ceases to exist. Though poorly ratified, the Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two international treaties on statelessness do not envisage the eventuality of literal, physical statelessness. 95 In any event, the legal definition of 'statelessness' is carefully and deliberately circumscribed to apply only to de jure statelessness-premised on the denial of nationality through the operation of the law of a particular State. 96 It does not even extend to the situation of de facto statelessness-where a person formally has a nationality, but which is ineffective in practice, although the non-binding Final Act of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons suggests that 'persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality'. Thus, the instruments' tight juridical focus leaves little scope for arguing for a broader interpretation that would encompass people whose State is at risk of disappearing (unless, of course, the State formally withdrew nationality and through that act brought them within the legal concept of statelessness).
However, UNHCR's institutional mandate to prevent and reduce statelessness encompasses de facto statelessness as well. 97 In the 'sinking State' context, UNHCR has argued that even if the international community were to continue to acknowledge a State's on-going existence, despite signs that it no longer met the full indicia of statehood, its population could be regarded as de facto stateless. This view is based on the many practical constraints that the government would face in such a scenario, which would mean that 'their populations would be likely to find themselves largely in a situation that would be similar to if not the same as if statehood had ceased.'
98 From an institutional perspective, UNHCR is empowered to engage with States about preventing statelessness and therefore advocating on behalf of affected populations. In this regard, it has suggested that multilateral comprehensive agreements would facilitate planned and orderly movement to other States, and that the early introduction of educational and other measures to prepare people for displacement could not increase their resilience and adaptability once they move, but also while they remain on their islands. 99 Furthermore, the 1954 Convention's drafting history reveals that while its authors recognised that many de facto stateless persons were in the same position as de jure stateless persons (because despite legally being nationals of a particular State, they could not derive any benefits from it), their reluctance to include the latter class within the definition of a stateless person stemmed in part from the difficulty in proving loss or lack of nationality in such cases. 100 Arguably, in the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati, at a certain point the objective evidence will make clear that continued habitation in those territories is imminently impossible. In keeping with the object and purpose of the treaty, and the recommendation in the Final Act of the 1954 Convention that de facto stateless persons be treated in the same way as de jure stateless persons, one might argue that the benefits of the Convention should be extended to them. However, the Convention only binds States that have ratified it, and only in relation to stateless persons within their territory. Few States even have a status determination procedure to identify stateless persons, by contrast to refugees. Accordingly, its practical application may be limited. Attention would therefore be better focused on States' duty to prevent statelessness, 101 as outlined by UNHCR in the present context:
To prevent temporary statelessness, acquisition of an effective nationality should be foreseen prior to the dissolution of the affected State. Dual nationality may therefore need to be permitted at least for a transitional period. As well, a waiver may be required of formal requirements for renunciation or acquisition of nationality which might be difficult to fulfil for affected populations. Such arrangements would need to provide inter alia for the right of residence, military obligations, health care, pensions and other social security benefits. Citizens of affected States that might have been displaced earlier, possibly to third States not party to the agreement, may also need to be considered. (although the political likelihood of this happening today seems remote). 103 Theoretically, too, it would be possible for one State to 'lease' territory from another, although one might query the extent to which power could then be freely exercised sufficiently to meet the other requirements of statehood in such a case: while a State might be afforded jurisdiction over that territory, it would not be unencumbered by the 'landlord' State's territorial jurisdiction unless expressly obtained from the previous sovereign.
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IX RELOCATION
104
A related issue, and one perennially discussed in the 'sinking State' context, is the en masse relocation of a State's population to another country. Both Kiribati and Tuvalu have raised this on occasion with Australia and New Zealand, 105 but most recently, and most vocally, it has been embraced by the President of the Maldives who, on coming to office, boldly stated that he was seeking to purchase land in India or Australia to which to relocate his nation. 106 Subsequently, although it is unclear whether this was in direct response, the Indonesian Maritime Minister announced that Indonesia was considering renting out some of its 17,500 islands to 'climate change refugees'. . This process of creation and dissolution alone indicates that it was not a sovereign equal of Canada, and historians have consistently emphasised that the settlers had no intention of creating an Icelandic colony: WJ Lindal, The Icelanders in Canada (Winnipeg/Ottawa, National Publishers, 1967) 135. This is reflected in an address given on the occasion of the Canadian Governor-General's visit to New Iceland on 14 September 1877: 'We have gathered under the flag of our new land, and as British subjects … We accept gladly our new way of life as British subjects with the opportunity to acquire all the freedom and rights which pertain thereto. As British subjects, we desire that these rights be granted to us, and we are firmly resolved to preserve them. We are prepared to do our share in the maintenance of public order, and in the defense of our country, to perform the duties which England expects of every There is much more to relocation than simply securing territory, however. Those who move need to know that they can remain and re-enter the new country, enjoy work rights and health rights there, have access to social security if necessary, be able to maintain their culture and traditions, 108 and also what the status of children born there would be. The acquisition of land alone does not secure immigration or citizenship rights, but is simply a private property transaction.
109 Unless individuals personally acquire such rights (and in some cases, even if they do but retain dual nationality 110 ), there is little in international law that would prevent a host country from expelling them should it wish to do so. It is only with formal cession of land at the State-to-State level that one State acquires the lawful international title to it and nationals can move to that area as part of their own national territory. The likelihood of this happening today is remote. Thus, if en masse relocation to another country is to be considered as a permanent solution, then issues other than land alone need to be considered in order to provide security for the future.
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Even when such legal issues are resolved, relocation may still not be a popular option. As the following example from the Pacific region illustrates, concerns about the maintenance of identity, culture, social practices and land tenure are very real to those whose movement is proposed, and these may not be readily understood by outsiders. This, in turn, may lead to misunderstandings and misguided policies, which can have negative long-term, intergenerational affects.
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In the 1960s, as a result of the immense environmental destruction caused to that island by phosphate mining, it was proposed that the population of Nauru be resettled in Australia. 113 Sites were originally investigated in and around Papua New Guinea but did not meet the three necessary requirements: 'employment opportunities enabling Nauruans to maintain their standard of living; a community which would accept the Nauruans; and willingness and Furthermore, as Campbell discusses, the ability of States to give away land is itself may raise serious human rights considerations for those already inhabiting (or with claims to) that land: J Campbell, 'Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land', in the present volume. 112 See ibid.
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Nauru had been a British mandate territory administered on behalf of the League of Nations. In 1919, Australia, the UK and New Zealand entered into an Agreement about to jointly control the administration of Nauru, predominantly to facilitate phosphate mining. When the UN's international trusteeship system succeeded the League's mandate system, it became a trust territory of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (the 'partner governments').
readiness on the part of the Nauruans to mix with the existing people.'
114 On 12 October 1960, the partner governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom agreed to offer permanent residence and citizenship in those countries to any Nauruans willing 'to transfer to those countries and are likely to be able to adapt themselves to life there'. 115 While Australian government documents state that: 'It was envisaged that the transfer should take place gradually over a period of 30 or more years and that some material assistance to that end would be given', 116 the Nauruan view was that '[i]t was never envisaged that all Nauruans would take up the offer. Many would stay, and it was understood that Nauru would always remain a spiritual home for those resettled.'
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The resettlement offer was rejected by the Nauru Local Government Council on the basis that the very nature of the scheme 'would lead to the assimilation of the Nauruans into the metropolitan communities where they settled'. 118 The Nauruans instead requested an island of their own in a temperate zone, and in 1963 Australia offered them Curtis Island (near Gladstone, Queensland). The Nauruans were to be given freehold title; pastoral, agricultural, fishing and commercial activities were to be established; and 'and the entire costs of resettlement including housing and community services such as electricity, water and sewerage etc would be met out of funds provided by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It was estimated that the cost would be in the region of 10 million pounds.'
119 While Australia made clear that 'Australian sovereignty would not be surrendered over any mainland or island location', 120 those resettled would 'be enabled to manage their own local administration and to make domestic laws or regulations applicable to their own community', subject to their acceptance of 'the privileges and responsibilities of Australian citizenship'.
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Nauru again rejected the offer, deeming these political arrangements unsatisfactory. The Nauruan representatives feared that they would not be able to maintain their distinct identity and would be 'assimilated without trace into the Australian landscape.'
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Your terms insisted on our becoming Australians with all that citizenship entails, whereas we wish to remain as a Nauruan people in the fullest sense of the term even if we were resettled on Curtis Island. To owe allegiance to ourselves does not mean that we are coming to your shores to do you harm or become the means whereby harm will be done to you through us. We have tried to assure you of this from the beginning. Your reply has been to the effect that we cannot give such an assurance as future Nauruan leaders and people may not think the same as we do. Nauruan and Australian perspectives on the issue of relocation reveal quite different approaches as to why it failed. Nauru claimed that resettlement in Australia was offered as a quick-fix solution that would cost the Australians far less than rehabilitating the land. 124 It saw it as 'an attempt to break up the Nauruan identity and their strong personal and spiritual relationship with the island', 125 ignoring Nauruan land tenure laws and 'the right of the Nauruan people at international law to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.' 126 The Nauruans maintained that they were never 'seeking full sovereign independence' over Curtis Island, but that 'anything which did not preserve and maintain [their] separate identity was quite unacceptable.'
127 By contrast, the Australian government believed it was making 'a genuine and generous attempt to meet the wishes of the Nauruan people', 128 and regarded the sovereignty issue as the sticking point in negotiations.
Cultural misunderstandings about the importance of land and cultural identity remain at the heart of discussions today about relocating entire Pacific communities in response to climate impacts. While some suggestions to relocate entire communities are no doubt well-intentioned, there are significant implications of doing so with a top-down approach. As Campbell notes, the effects of dislocation from home can last for generations, and can have significant ramifications for the maintenance and enjoyment of cultural and social rights by resettled communities. Indeed, as Nauru observed about its own negotiations with Australia: 'But Nauru would, at that point, still have remained under Trusteeship. Resettlement would not have granted to Australia or the British Phosphate Commissioners any further title to the land than that which they could claim under the Trusteeship. By the act of resettlement. Nauru was not to be annexed to Australia. As a self-determination unit, the Nauruan community could still seek control in Nauru both politically, through independence, and economically, in respect of the phosphate industry': Written Statement of Nauru, above n 117, para 18. the State's only high ground, Banaba Island, so as to retain the State and its control over resources, such as those generated by its extensive exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
A more radical alternative, however, would see the deliberate, earlier dissolution of the independent, sovereign State, but with the aim of preserving the 'nation'-as an identifiable national, linguistic and cultural community-for longer. 131 For many Tuvaluans and i-Kiribati, the issues of key importance to them are the retention of 'home'-land, community, identityrather than preserving the political entity of the State itself. 132 Indeed, a claim to selfdetermination does not necessarily involve a claim to statehood and secession. 133 There are a number of ways in which a move away from fully-fledged statehood to a selfgoverning alternative could be undertaken. For present purposes, the option considered is one based on a well-established model within the Pacific: self-governance in free association with another State. The rationale behind this model is to respect 'the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples' and give the associated territory 'the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference', 134 while certain functions (such as defence) are carried out by another State. Crawford describes association as 'one of the more significant possibilities of self-government communities (especially island communities) that are too small to be economically and politically viable standing alone.' 135 It is also familiar in the Pacific context, being the relationship of the Cook Islands and Niue vis-à-vis New Zealand. 136 That there is no single concept of self-governance is borne out in the different approaches of Niue and the Cook Islands. 137 The Cook Islands has continually stressed its independence, 138 while Niue has resisted being treated like an independent State 139 (indeed the constitution of Niue commits New Zealand to provide it with 'necessary economic and administrative assistance'). Nonetheless, both are separate administrative entities within the Realm of New Zealand, their governments have full executive powers and their parliaments can make their own laws. By agreement, Niueans and Cook Islanders hold New Zealand citizenship (and do not have additional Niuean or Cook Islands citizenship) and can freely enter, live and work in New Zealand (and thus also Australia). 140 There are historical reasons for this relationship. 141 
142
A federal State is 'a sole person in the eyes of international law': Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art 2. Federation is not discussed here, since it would require the dissolution of Kiribati or Tuvalu as a State. As a system of political organisation in which a State is comprised of different national groups, Brownlie regards federalism as 'probably better able than any other system to provide a regime of stable autonomy which provides group freedoms within a wider political cosmos and keeps the principle of nationality in line with ideas of mutuality and genuine coexistence of peoples': Brownlie, above n 133, 6. See further Crawford, above n 6, 483-89. 143 This is the basis on which the Cocos (Keeling) Islands joined Australia. Principle IX of the Annex to UNGA Res 1541 (XV) (15 December 1960) assumes that the people of the State that integrates into another should be treated as equal citizens of the integrating State, accorded full citizenship rights and freedom of movement: see Crawford, above n 6, 624. 144 See AHA Soons, 'The Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and Boundaries' (1990) 37 Netherlands International Law Review 207. Rayfuse, above n 108, 11 has suggested that conditions of merger could include a requirement that any revenue generated from these territorial acquisitions be placed into a trust fund to pay for the resettlement of the merging State's population (including on-going costs that might normally be borne by the State, such as pensions, although it should be noted that there is very little social security in Kiribati or Tuvalu). Rayfuse, above n 104, 13 writes: 'in an international community still based on the Westphalian notion of states, it may not be appropriate or realistic to envisage the permanent establishment and continuing existence of deterritorialised states ad infinitum. Rather, it may be useful to view this status as transitional, lasting perhaps one generation (30 yrs) or one human lifetime (100 yrs), by which time it is likely that much else in the international legal regime, including the existing law of the sea regime, will have to be reconsidered and reconfigured, in any event.'
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Although the better view is that recognition is declaratory, rather than constitutive, of statehood, it is acknowledged that 'the present state of the law makes it possible that different states should act on different views of the application of the law to the same state of facts': DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6 th edn (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2004) 145.
'full' powers of States to act, they have certain functional powers that enable them to operate as persons of sorts at the international level.
148
If Tuvalu and Kiribati were at some point regarded as having acquired a different kind of international legal personality, other than as a State, then (in the absence of acquisition of a new nationality) their former nationals could be said to meet the definition of a 'stateless person' in article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: people 'not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law'. This is because in international law, when a State ceases to exist, so does nationality of that State. 149 States parties to the 1954 Convention would thus be obliged to afford former nationals the rights contained within it, including 'as far as possible facilitat[ing] the[ir] assimilation and naturalization '. 150 While this would finally bring those displaced within an existing legal category, it is far from adequate as a means of addressing potential displacement from small island States. It is reactive, rather than proactive; requires people to leave their homes and be present in the territory of a State party to the Convention in order to claim its benefits; and in the absence of any status determination procedure for stateless persons, there is no clear means by which those benefits could be accessed.
While there is no simple legal 'solution' to the 'disappearing States' phenomenon and the status of those displaced, it is important to be aware of the human rights implications of certain mooted alternatives, in particular with respect to (and for) individual and community decisionmaking and choices. Historical examples from the Pacific show that relocation en masse, while theoretically a means of maintaining cultural integrity, has been fraught with difficulties in practice, and risks being seen as a top-down 'solution' that strips individuals and communities of agency. By contrast, self-governance in free association with another State is an option that would preserve a degree of autonomy and sense of 'nation' and culture for some time, but it is questionable whether this move away from full statehood would presently appeal to recently independent States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, and, moreover, to potential partner States like Australia and New Zealand.
Paradoxically, planned and staggered migration over time-the solution favoured by Pacific islanders if in situ adaptation to climate change is not possible-may ultimately start to erode longer-term claims to continued sovereignty and statehood, since the State's 'disappearance' may begin once the bulk of the permanent population has moved abroad and obtained a legal status in that new country (either through naturalisation or by being born a citizen there). Additionally, though the 'population' criterion of statehood does not require that a majority of nationals live within the State's territory, a substantial loss of population would start to erode the effectiveness of the State's government as its economic base declined. However, 148 It is not certain that small island States such as Kiribati and Tuvalu would ever fall into this category, only because States sometimes continue to recognise statehood even when its criteria 'are only marginally (if at all) complied with': Crawford, above n 6, 223. This is the case with the State of the Vatican City. The strength and influence of its government, the Holy See, compensates for its very small territory and lack of a permanent population, in the same way that in certain 'failed States', the existence of territory and people compensate for the virtual absence of a government: Crawford, above n 6, 223. The question is whether, in the absence of a permanent population within a diminishing territory, other States would be prepared to continue to recognise Tuvalu and Kiribati as on-going States or not.
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As Weis, above n 86, 136 notes: 'In the case of universal succession, the predecessor State is extinguished and its nationality ceases to exist. All persons who were nationals of the predecessor State cease to be such.' 150 1954 Convention, art 32. migration seems to be the option that will offer individuals and households the most choice about when to move, and which will afford them the opportunity to establish 'pockets' of their communities abroad which others can join over time. It also enables potential host States to better plan for inward-movement and develop culturally-sensitive policies towards those migrants, rather than trying to spontaneously accommodate people who do not easily fit existing legal categories.
